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Equal Protection and Ectogenesis 
Brit Janeway Benjamin* 
ABSTRACT 
Ectogenesis is the gestation of a fetus in an artificial womb. This 
suite of technologies, now in use to preserve the lives of premature 
infants, is on the cusp of being a viable method of reproduction from 
conception to term. This Article argues that an equal protection 
challenge to a ban on utilizing ectogenetic technologies should be 
analyzed under intermediate or strict scrutiny. Should the US Supreme 
Court apply the rational basis or rational basis “with bite” standard of 
review to such a challenge, the petitioner should prevail. 
The nature of ectogenesis is a technological alternative for a  
sex-specific organ. Intermediate scrutiny is well suited to address the 
discriminatory intent and effect behind denying access to ectogenesis, 
particularly against the backdrop of an extensive history of bipartisan 
legislative support for other artificial organs like the pancreas, kidneys, 
and heart. Strict scrutiny further supports protecting access to 
ectogenesis, as the fundamental right to procreative freedom necessarily 
encapsulates choosing the method of gestating one’s offspring. 
While there are legitimate state interests in regulating the 
practice of medicine and ensuring the safety of reproductive 
biotechnology, prohibiting the use of ectogenesis on the grounds of 
preserving the natural order or moral disapproval would fail under even 
the most deferential rational basis review standard. Considering the 
immutability of reproductive roles, as well as the significance of the right 
to choose one’s method of reproduction, if the Court applies this 
deferential standard, the rational basis should “bite.”  
Under the aforementioned standards of review, access to these 
important reproductive biotechnologies should be protected. Whether the 
Court finds invidious gender discrimination, the infringement of the 
fundamental right to procreate, or impermissible moral condemnation, 
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it is likely that a ban on ectogenesis would be found to be 
unconstitutional.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A very premature infant lies in an incubation bed in a neonatal 
intensive care unit (NICU). Born at twenty-four weeks of gestation, she 
is considered periviable, meaning born right at the threshold of modern 
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medicine’s capacity to save her life.1 Her breathing is supported by 
continuous positive airway pressure, which keeps the air passages in 
her fragile lungs open.2 Continuous bedside telemetry monitors her 
seizure activity and pulmonary function.3 An extracorporeal membrane 
oxygenation system takes blood from her veins, pumps it through an 
artificial lung where oxygen is added and carbon dioxide removed, and 
then returns the blood back into her body.4 The acidity of her blood is 
monitored and adjusted using a self-contained blood gas laboratory.5 
Countless other technologies support this fragile new life as she 
struggles to build enough strength to survive. Her parents spend every 
day of her three-month NICU stay praying for medical miracles and 
treasuring small victories. Her doctors rely on partial ectogenetic 
technology to replicate as many of the functions of the mother’s body as 
possible to, in essence, continue the infant’s gestation extracorporeally. 
Ectogenesis is the gestation of a fetus outside of a woman’s body 
in another substrate, sometimes called an “artificial womb.” The term 
was coined by J.B.S. Haldane in a 1923 lecture to the Heretics Society 
at Cambridge.6 The etymology of ectogenesis is from the ancient Greek 
ektòs (“outside”) and “genesis” (“origin” or “production”).7 Partial 
ectogenesis refers to the types of technologies described above, and it is 
used all over the world in advanced NICUs to save the lives of 
premature infants. Full ectogenesis refers to comprehensive external 
gestation, potentially from conception in a laboratory to term and 
delivery. 
Twenty years ago, it was all but impossible for a  
twenty-four-week-old premature infant to survive to hospital 
discharge.8 With every passing year, survival rates increase and the 
risk of long-term serious disability decreases. In the 1980s, continuous 
 
 1. See The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Periviable Birth, 130 OBSTETRIC 
CARE CONSENSUS e187, e188–89 (2017). 
 2. See Life-Saving Technology in the NICU, CHOC, https://www.choc.org/programs-ser-
vices/nicu/technology [https://perma.cc/JAL4-R6WX] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. J.B.S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS OR SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE 63–67 (1924); see Zoltan 
Istvan, Artificial Wombs Are Coming, but the Controversy Is Already Here, VICE (Aug. 4, 2014, 3:26 
PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/8qx8kk/artificial-wombs-are-coming-and-the-controversys-
already-here [https://perma.cc/U84U-275G]. 
 7. See Patricia de Vries, The Speculative Design of Immaculate Motherhood, DIGICULT, 
http://digicult.it/design/the-speculative-design-of-immaculate-motherhood/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6GJC-YYA3] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021); Ectogenesis, WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktion-
ary.org/wiki/ectogenesis [https://perma.cc/L6HA-MMYJ] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
 8. See LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: HOW GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING WILL 
TRANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 66–67 (1997). 
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positive airway pressure (CPAP) and mechanical ventilation were used 
to support extremely premature infants.9 By the mid-to-late 1990s, 
exogenous surfactants—which support fragile lungs from collapse—and 
antenatal steroids (to accelerate the maturation of fetal organs) became 
part of the neonatologists’ repertoire, substantially increasing survival 
rates.10 These and other technological advances pushed viability from 
25–26 weeks in the mid-1990s to 23–24 weeks by the mid-2000s.11 
Infants now routinely survive delivery at 23–24 weeks. Survival rates 
continually tick up while subsequent morbidities gradually decrease.12 
In essence, by using partial ectogenetic technology, better mimicking 
the support provided by a mother’s uterus, researchers and doctors 
continue to expand the timeframe within which infants can be gestated 
ex vivo. 
Ectogenesis captures the imagination. Haldane’s talk to the 
Heretics Society directly inspired Aldous Huxley’s classic work of 
fiction, Brave New World, forever cementing ectogenesis in the 
collective consciousness as extreme and dystopic. Feminists speculate 
that ectogenesis will either liberate women from the foundational 
biological disadvantage of gestation or, alternatively, usher in a  
mass “gynocide” by rendering women biologically expendable.13 It is 
unsurprising that full ectogenesis triggers such a visceral response.  
The emergence of this technology would represent a fundamental  
disruption of The Way Things Are. Decoupling women’s bodies from  
reproduction—for those that opt to—could make the humankind of the 
future as different from present-day humans as Homo habilis was from 
Australopithecus.14 It would transform our species in unknown ways, 
and that disruptive potential has generated decades of dystopian fiction 
and bioethicist fretting. 
It seems intuitive that most would not object to the use of partial 
ectogenetic technology to save the lives of premature infants. Yet, the 
objections to full ectogenesis or voluntary reproduction via ectogenesis 
 
 9. Hannah C. Glass, Andrew T. Costarino, Stephen A. Stayer, Claire M. Brett, Franklyn 
Cladis & Peter J. Davis, Outcomes for Extremely Premature Infants, 120 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 
1337, 1339 (2015). 
 10. Id. at 1337–42. 
 11. Id. at 1340. 
 12. Id. at 1340–42. 
 13. See SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 205–07 (1970); ANDREA DWORKIN, 
RIGHT-WING WOMEN 191–94 (1983). 
 14. Australopithecines are considered to be the missing link between apes and the genus 
Homo. They had smaller cranial mass and more pronounced jaws. See Adam P. Van Arsdale,  
Homo Erectus – A Bigger, Smarter, Faster Hominin Lineage, NATURE EDUC. KNOWLEDGE  
PROJECT (2013), https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/homo-erectus-a-bigger-
smarter-97879043/ [https://perma.cc/YW5Q-XYFS]. 
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abound. Somewhere along the spectrum of intervention, somewhere 
between the use of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation and full 
ectogenesis, revulsion kicks in for many. That revulsion even unifies 
disparate and surprising groups like family-values Republican senators 
and every flavor of feminist. 
But the equal protection clause is concerned with equality under 
the law and specifically precludes government action that is motivated 
by disgust or stereotypes. This Article argues that whether the Court 
ultimately applies intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, rational basis 
review, or rational basis “with bite,” the use of full ectogenesis for 
reproductive purposes ought to be protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause. Moral objections cannot 
legitimately bar access, nor can dystopian science fantasies. Both the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and ectogenesis 
are tools for promoting the flourishing of human life. Full ectogenesis is 
coming, perhaps within a few years. Society must be prepared to 
grapple with the constitutional issues implicated by its birth.  
Part II of the Article gives an overview of available and nascent 
ectogenetic technologies. In Part III, it sets forth the approach to the 
equal protection analysis herein. Part IV explores how gender-based 
classifications made in the regulation of ectogenesis might trigger the 
application of intermediate scrutiny and the likelihood of success under 
that standard of review. Part V considers whether a ban on full, 
voluntary ectogenesis infringes on the fundamental right to procreate, 
thus triggering strict scrutiny. Parts VI and VII assess how a rational 
basis or rational basis “with bite” analysis might apply if the Court 
found no suspect class or fundamental right was implicated by a ban on 
ectogenesis.  
II. STATUS OF THE TECHNOLOGY 
The “14-day rule” is a prohibition on research that involves 
growing human embryos ex vivo beyond fourteen days from 
fertilization. The rule has been adopted in at least seventeen  
countries, including the United States, either by legislative acts or  
government-issued scientific guidelines.15 Since its emergence in a 1979 
report by the Ethics Advisory Board of the United States Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, the 14-day rule has substantially 
impacted the rate and nature of research into human reproduction and 
reproductive biotechnology. Indeed, between 1979 and 2016, progress 
 
 15. See Insoo Hyun, Amy Wilkerson & Josephine Johnston, Comment, Revisit the 14-Day 
Rule, 533 NATURE 169, 170 (2016). 
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toward ectogenesis moved slowly, and there were few major advances. 
In 1996, Yoshinori Kuwabara, then-chairman of Tokyo’s Jutendo 
University Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, developed a 
technique for gestating periviable goat fetuses in a synthetic uterus 
termed “extrauterine fetal incubation.”16 His team’s work, which used 
oxygenated blood and artificial amniotic fluid, was widely reported as 
an important step forward in embryology, despite technical difficulties 
and the ultimate death of the goat fetuses.17 
However, due to advances in embryology and the growing 
awareness of the potential medical value of research into early human 
development, the movement to abolish or substantially alter the 14-day 
rule found international support among researchers and bioethicists by 
2016.18 When researchers at Cambridge University and Rockefeller 
University in New York announced their successful growth of human 
embryos in vitro for thirteen days, the debate surrounding the 14-day 
rule was once again revived.19 This announcement—wherein the 
scientists profoundly expanded the window of functional ex vivo 
gestation via “[a]n improved culture medium and a better substrate for 
embryo attachment”—renewed the bioethical debate about limitations 
on human embryo research.20 
Prior to this 2016 announcement, Dr. Hung-Ching Liu—a 
researcher at Cornell University’s Department of Reproductive 
Medicine—ran up against the 14-day rule in her team’s embryological 
research. In 2003, Liu and her team successfully gestated a mouse 
embryo in a bioprosthetic uterus, almost to full term.21 Following that 
success, Dr. Liu grew a human embryo in a similar bioengineered 
uterus for ten days, terminating the incubation prior to the  
fourteen-day limit placed on embryological researchers.22 Liu, whose 
 
 16. Perri Klass, The Artificial Womb Is Born, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 29, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/29/magazine/the-artificial-womb-is-born.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/83DZ-82RS]. 
 17. Id.; Katarina Lee, Ectogenesis, 2 VOICES IN BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2016). 
 18. See Sarah Knapton, ‘Artificial Womb’ Breakthrough Sparks Row over How Long  
Human Embryos Should Be Kept in Lab, TELEGRAPH (May 4, 2016, 10:00 PM), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/science/2016/05/04/artificial-womb-breakthrough-sparks-row-over-how-long-human-
embr/ [https://perma.cc/3EMF-DUH2]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Janet Rossant, Implantation Barrier Overcome, 533 NATURE 182, 182–83 (2016). 
 21. Gretchen Reynolds, Artificial Wombs, POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 1, 2005), https://www.pop-
sci.com/scitech/article/2005-08/artificial-wombs/ [https://perma.cc/DAR9-ZZV3]. At this time, Dr. 
Liu was serving as the Director of the Reproductive Endocrine Laboratory at the Center for  
Reproductive Medicine and Infertility at Cornell. See id.  
 22. Soraya Chemaly, What Do Artificial Wombs Mean for Women?, REWIRE NEWS GRP. 
(Feb. 23, 2012, 8:11 AM), https://rewire.news/article/2012/02/23/what-do-artificial-wombs-mean-
women/ [https://perma.cc/7QSX-3UXZ]. 
2021] EQUAL PROTECTION AND ECTOGENESIS 785 
ultimate goal is to develop a “functioning external womb,” grew a 
bioprosthetic uterus by “adding engineered endometrium tissue to a 
bio-engineered, extra-uterine ‘scaffold.’”23  
The race to develop full ectogenesis was now in full swing. In 
April 2017, researchers at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia 
(CHOP) published the results of their fetal lamb study wherein their 
novel system of extracorporeal gestation successfully supported the 
growth of extremely premature and periviable fetal lambs.24 The CHOP 
researchers’ system, termed the “biobag,” was intended to closely mimic 
the conditions of a sheep uterus, hosting the lambs in a closed synthetic 
amniotic sac, circulating fetal blood to oxygenate it, and utilizing an 
umbilical interface to their pumpless oxygenator circuit.25 The system 
was pumpless in order to protect the fragile fetal hearts from overload 
and thus was powered by the beating of the fetal hearts themselves.26 
The lambs were born and grew up normally without complications or 
defects.27 Dr. Flake, the fetal surgeon in charge of these experiments, 
believes his biobag technology could be available for human use within 
a few years.28 
Hoping to build on CHOP’s successful incubation of lambs, 
researchers at the Dutch Eindhoven University of Technology received 
a grant of €2.9 million to build a prototype of a new artificial womb in 
October 2019.29 The grant was awarded through the Horizon 2020 EU 
Program and will enable the Dutch researchers to more accurately 
model the experience of a baby in utero using 3D-printed replicas of 
human babies monitored with sensors.30 
Along with these more visible and controversial announcements, 
advances in the less contentious constituent parts of artificial womb 
technologies have progressed steadily, mostly without bioethicist and 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Emily A. Partridge, Marcus G. Davey, Matthew A. Hornick, Patrick E. McGovern, Ali 
Y. Mejaddam, Jesse D. Vrecenak, Carmen Mesas-Burgos, Aliza Olive, Robert C. Caskey, Theodore 
R. Weiland, Jiancheng Han, Alexander J. Schupper, James T. Connelly, Kevin C. Dysart, Jack 
Rychik, Holly L. Hedrick, William H. Peranteau & Alan W. Flake, An Extra-Uterine System to 
Physiologically Support the Extreme Premature Lamb, NATURE COMMC’NS, Apr. 25, 2017, at 1, 2. 
 25. Id. at 2–3. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Zoltan Istvan, The Abortion Debate Is Stuck. Are Artificial Wombs the Answer?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/opinion/sunday/abortion-technology-
debate.html [https://perma.cc/96FM-QQ6K]. 
 29. Nicola Davis, Artificial Womb: Dutch Researchers Given €2.9m to Develop Prototype, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2019, 7:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/oct/08/artificial-
womb-dutch-researchers-given-29m-to-develop-prototype [https://perma.cc/2CB6-84RP]. 
 30. Id. 
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journalistic attention. Improvements in scaffolding materials, 
substrates, tubing, and fluid filtration make once-science-fiction 
artificial wombs more likely with each passing year. Whether it takes 
years or decades to achieve full human ectogenesis, a technological 
innovation of this magnitude will certainly engender debates about the 
bioethical and legal issues created by its use or regulation. Next, this 
Article addresses the question of whether the existing equal protection 
clause jurisprudence likely protects the right to reproduce with 
ectogenesis. 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION FOR REPRODUCTIVE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
While the due process clause likely provides protection against 
a ban on ectogenesis via the fundamental procreative liberty it 
enshrines, the equal protection clause provides another avenue through 
which the right to gestate via ectogenesis could be protected.31 The same 
body of law ensuring a robust right to reproductive privacy under the 
due process clause and the right to be free from government 
discrimination under the equal protection clause ought to protect the 
use of other forms of reproductive biotechnology. While this Article’s 
analysis is focused on ectogenetic technology, most arguments made 
herein can be logically extended to protect the individual use of in vitro 
fertilization, traditional gestational surrogacy, and other forms of 
reproductive biotechnology as of yet unknown to us. Because it is 
unclear how the Supreme Court would orient itself toward reproductive 
ectogenesis, this Article will evaluate the probability of a successful 
challenge under each of the four analytical methods that the Court 
historically uses for equal protection challenges.  
This Article concludes that whatever the standard of review, as 
outlined below, a ban on ectogenesis would be unlikely to pass 
constitutional muster. Given the dangers of traditional gestation, a 
technological alternative could save countless maternal and fetal lives. 
Beyond the physical impacts of gestation, this Article discusses the 
social and economic costs of traditional physical gestation and the 
disproportionate harms borne by gestating women. When ectogenesis 
reaches the stage of safety and availability for patient adoption, all but 
the most regressive and illegitimate government interests will remain. 
As discussed herein, a ban on this technology would thus violate the 
equal protection clause’s guarantees against legislation that promotes 
 
 31. See Brit Janeway Benjamin, Ectogenesis: Is There a Constitutional Right to  
Substrate-Independent Wombs?, 20 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 166 (2020). 
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mandatory adherence to traditional sex and gender roles, including that 
which ensures a permanent gestating caste. 
First, this Article discusses the intermediate scrutiny standard 
applied to gender-based classifications. As a threshold matter, a 
gender-based classification can only withstand intermediate scrutiny if 
the challenged classification serves important government objectives 
and the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the 
achievement of that objective.32  
Second, this Article considers strict scrutiny, which is applied to 
violations of equal protection where a fundamental right is implicated. 
When government action treats classes of people unequally with regard 
to a fundamental right, the court applies strict scrutiny. The 
government then bears the burden of proving the classification is 
narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling government interest.33 
Third, this Article considers a ban on ectogenesis under the 
rational basis test. Under this test, the classification carries a 
presumption of constitutionality, and the claimant must prove that the 
government action is not even a rational means for furthering a 
legitimate government interest. This is the standard most deferential 
to the government. Even in light of the extraordinary deference to the 
government’s actions, this Article argues that a ban on voluntary 
reproduction via ectogenesis could not survive an equal protection 
challenge under rational basis review. 
Fourth, this Article analyzes ectogenesis under the rational 
basis “with bite” standard set forth in Plyler v. Doe for classifications 
based on a semi-suspect class or regarding a semi-fundamental right.34 
Although this standard has been used only sparingly, when used, the 
Court applies a presumption of unconstitutionality requiring the 
government to prove that the classification was “a demonstrably and 
substantially effective means to further its goals.”35 For this rule to 
apply, the challenger must demonstrate “that the class affected has 
some similarities to suspect or semi-suspect classes, that the right 
affected is very important, and the disability imposed is very severe.”36 
 
 32. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 33. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Strict Scrutiny, CORNELL L. SCH. 
LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny [https://perma.cc/GAJ4-
LRXK] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). 
 34. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982). 
 35. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
121, 158 (1989). 
 36. Id. 
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IV. GENDER-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
A statute that discriminates on the basis of gender is presumed 
unconstitutional and evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review.37 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the gender 
classification “serve important government objectives and must be 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”38 Before 
evaluating whether the statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny, 
however, the court must evaluate whether the gender classification 
appears in the statute. If the statute is gender-neutral on its face, the 
challenger bears the burden of establishing that the government’s 
classification discriminates both in effect and purpose—often referred 
to as the “Feeney evil purpose test.”39 This Part addresses facial 
neutrality and assesses how government action may or may not satisfy 
the Feeney evil purpose test if it banned ectogenesis.  
A. Facial or Neutral Classification 
The government could establish an ectogenesis ban that equally 
restricts all people from the gestation, development, or nurturance of a 
child via ectogenesis. In this hypothetical ban, the government would 
make no mention of the actor’s gender, and it would disallow all people 
from participating in full reproductive ectogenesis. This hypothetical 
statutory language, modeled off of existing state anti-cloning laws,40 
reflects what such a facially neutral ban may look like: 
No person shall gestate, develop, or otherwise nurture a human embryo or fetus 
extracorporeally after fourteen days from fertilization, except for the purpose of 
preserving the life or health of an infant born of a woman before reaching full term. 
This type of statute prohibits ectogenesis for reproductive 
purposes, except to preserve the life and health of premature infants. 
The language “born of a woman” is drawn from state and federal 
statutes regarding personhood, parentage, and putative fatherhood, 
and would likely be included to exempt the widely supported practice of 
saving infants who are born preterm following in vivo gestation.41 
 
 37. Id. at 142. 
 38. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 39. Galloway, supra note 35, at 142. 
 40. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-727(B) (West 2020); 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 
960.007 (2020). 
 41. See generally 1 U.S.C. § 8(a)–(b) (defining the word “person” as “every infant member 
of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development”). A member of the 
species Homo sapiens is born alive following “the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her 
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If a state adopts a similar statute in which there are no facial 
classifications, then constitutional challengers will bear the burden of 
satisfying the Feeney evil purpose test before the Court applies 
intermediate scrutiny. Alternatively, if a future ban on ectogenesis 
includes a facial gender classification, then intermediate scrutiny would 
automatically apply. Given the legislative history of reproductive 
biotechnology statutes, however, it is unlikely that a state would enact 
a ban with facial gender classifications. 
B. Discriminatory Effect 
When a government action is facially neutral, whether 
heightened scrutiny applies depends on whether the government action 
discriminates in both effect and purpose. The discriminatory effect of a 
ban on ectogenesis is self-evident. The burdens borne by the female sex 
in traditional gestation are significant. Radhika Rao, a constitutional 
law scholar and professor at UC Hastings, powerfully and accurately 
described pregnancy as “a profound invasion of the body that imposes 
physical, psychological, and social burdens upon a woman, threatening 
both her right to bodily autonomy and gender equality.”42 The physical 
impacts of pregnancy for women are well measured, as are the economic 
risks. Pregnancy is uncomfortable in the best case, deadly in the worst, 
and always imposes social and financial costs that are unique to 
women.43 Even healthy women experience a range of symptoms, 
including “morning sickness, dizziness, headache, bone and muscle 
aches, loss of visual acuity, bleeding gums, breathlessness, heartburn, 
varicose veins and haemorrhoids.”44 In at least 15 percent of 
pregnancies, life-threatening complications arise to put the gestating 
mother at risk of death. Even safer deliveries can result in vaginal 
tearing and episiotomy.45 Women of advanced age or physical 
immaturity, and those who have ailments like diabetes or HIV, face 
increased physical risks from gestation and delivery. Further, working 
professionals who are visibly pregnant are “judged as less committed to 
their jobs, less dependable, and less authoritative” than nonpregnant 
 
mother of that member,” which would seem to exclude infants born via ectogenetic technology from 
legal personhood. See id. 
 42. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive 
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1485 (2008). 
 43. See Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. 
SOCIO. REV., no. 2, 2001, at 204, 219. 
 44. EVIE KENDAL, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE CASE FOR STATE SPONSORED 
ECTOGENESIS 3 (2015). 
 45. Id. 
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women in comparable managerial roles.46 Women whose careers render 
pregnancy unsafe or impossible must often sacrifice their careers to 
pursue motherhood or forgo it altogether.47 
The pursuit of procreative liberty is unique among all 
constitutional rights, as access to no other constitutional right is 
predicated upon a violation of bodily integrity. The absence of a 
negative right to utilize ectogenesis means that women must bear 
enormous physical risk, economic disadvantage, and social stigma just 
to participate in the central survival task of our species—procreation. 
Men bear no such costs. Therefore, it is clear that a ban on the use of 
ectogenesis would have a substantially disparate impact on women as 
a class. It would deprive women of an opportunity to remove a 
fundamental biological disadvantage, cementing a sexual hierarchy 
that could be avoided through technology. However, the profound 
discriminatory effect alone is not sufficient to justify the application of 
the intermediate scrutiny standard; the challenger must also prove that 
the government acted with a discriminatory purpose, as articulated in 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.  
C. Discriminatory Intent: Feeney Evil Purpose Test 
In Feeney, plaintiff Helen B. Feeney, a female nonveteran, 
challenged a Massachusetts statute that provided an absolute 
preference for hiring veterans to fill state civil service jobs on the 
grounds that the statute “operate[d] overwhelmingly to the advantage 
of males” in contravention of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.48 Although Feeney achieved the second- and 
third-highest scores on two of the civil service examinations she took, 
she was placed sixth on the list of eligible hires, behind five  
lower-scoring male veterans for one position and twelfth behind eleven 
male veterans for another.49 The Court found that the “impact of the 
veterans’ preference law upon the public employment opportunities of 
women ha[d] . . . been severe.”50 As the Court explained, the states 
retain power to make classifications that cause statutes to have uneven 
impact on certain groups and “uneven effects upon particular groups 
 
 46. Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood 
Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOCIO., no. 5, 2007, at 1297, 1298. 
 47. See Ellen L. Mozurkewich, Barbara Luke, Michal Avni & Fredric M. Wolf, Working 
Conditions and Adverse Pregnancy Outcome: A Meta-Analysis, 95 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, no. 
4, 2000, at 623, 633. 
 48. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979). 
 49. Id. at 264. 
 50. Id. at 271. 
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within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern.”51 However, 
certain classifications, such as race, “in themselves supply a reason to 
infer antipathy,” a motivation that does run afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.52  
Citing its prior decisions in Washington v. Davis and Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court held 
that “if a neutral law had a disproportionately adverse effect upon a 
racial minority, it is unconstitutional . . . only if that impact can be 
traced to a discriminatory purpose.”53 A law banning the use of 
ectogenetic technology would not likely classify individuals on the face 
of the statute. Instead, as with the hypothetical ban and current laws 
that ban human reproductive cloning, the law would likely seek to 
prohibit doctors, researchers, and prospective parents from utilizing the 
technologies for reproductive purposes.54 When a law “appears to be 
neutral but in reality is a subterfuge designed to impose hidden burdens 
on an unpopular class,” the Court will find that it violates the equal 
protection clause.55 
In Feeney, the Court articulated a two-part inquiry to be utilized 
when “a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground 
that its effects upon women are disproportionately adverse.”56 The first 
part seeks to determine “whether the statutory classification is indeed 
neutral in the sense that it is not gender based” and whether “the 
classification itself, covert or overt, is not based upon gender.”57  
The second part of the inquiry “is whether the adverse effect reflects 
invidious gender-based discrimination.”58 It is the “purposeful 
discrimination,” not the disproportionate impact alone, that is 
unconstitutional.59 Intermediate scrutiny is applied to facially neutral 
classifications where both parts of the test are satisfied. 
 
 51. Id. at 271–72 (first citing N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); then 
citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 538 (1972); and then citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 
137 (1971)). 
 52. Id. at 272. 
 53. Id.; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 54. See KERRY LYNN MACINTOSH, ILLEGAL BEINGS: HUMAN CLONES AND THE LAW 155 
(2005). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274. 
 57. Id. (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). 
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1. Whether the Classification Is Neutral-in-Fact 
In determining whether the veterans’ preference statute passed 
constitutional muster in Feeney, the Court stated that “[i]f the 
impact . . . could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact 
itself would signal that the real classification made by the law was in 
fact not neutral.”60 The Court evaluated the composition of the veteran 
class, noting that “[v]eteran status is not uniquely male” and that the 
“nonveteran class is not substantially all female.”61 It found that “[t]oo 
many men are affected [by the statute] to permit the inference that the 
statute is but a pretext for preferring men over women.”62 
In the ectogenesis context, there are persuasive indications that 
a ban would be “in fact not neutral.”63 Unlike veteran status, gestating 
status is unique to the female sex. All female-bodied individuals will 
decide whether to gestate after considering the costs and benefits of 
pregnancy and parenthood. Ectogenesis can influence this calculus 
because it alleviates some of the economic, political, and social costs of 
pregnancy that are borne all but exclusively by female-bodied 
individuals.64 Unlike the veterans in Feeney, the gestating class of 
people (those who would be disproportionately disadvantaged by a ban 
on ectogenesis) is exclusively female. 
Also in Feeney, the Court stated that a classification that  
was based on gender, either covertly or overtly, would not be  
neutral-in-fact.65 Thus, a statute outright banning ectogenesis might 
use ostensibly gender-neutral language, but the regulation would be 
inherently gender-referential by referring to gestation at all. The word 
“gestation” comes from the Latin word “gestare” meaning “to carry in 
the womb.”66 Since womb bearers are people with female reproductive 
organs, whatever their gender identity, any reference to gestation is a 
sex-specific reference. A statute regulating the manner of gestation will 
always be an overt or covert sex or gender reference. 
 
 60. Id. at 275 (first citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); and then citing 
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (first citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 242; and then citing Arlington Heights, 429 
U.S. at 266). 
 64. “All but exclusively” refers to the capacity for some transgender men, who have  
retained their uteruses post-transition, to gestate. See Thomas Beatie, Labor of Love, ADVOCATE 
(Mar. 14, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.advocate.com/news/2008/03/14/labor-love [https://perma.cc/ 
8B5U-XMRC]. 
 65. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252).  
 66. Gestate, LEXICO, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/gestate [https://perma.cc/ 
W9Z6-7T2M] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021). 
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Because the affected class of gestating people is occupied all but 
exclusively by females, and because any reference to gestation 
implicates female reproduction, the Court could reasonably find a ban 
on ectogenesis to not be neutral-in-fact. As a result, the Court would 
analyze the challenge under intermediate scrutiny. Should the Court 
find that a ban on ectogenesis is neutral-in-fact, a second inquiry would 
be required to assess whether the classification was motivated by 
invidious sex or gender discrimination. If the answer is affirmative, the 
Court would then analyze the statute under intermediate scrutiny.67 
2. Whether the Classification Is Motivated by Invidious Gender 
Discrimination 
In Feeney, the Court noted that the legislature must have been 
aware that “most veterans are men,” and that it would “thus be 
disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of the legislation for 
women were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or 
in the sense that they were not foreseeable.”68 However, intent as to 
discriminatory purpose “implies more than intent as volition or intent 
as awareness of consequences.”69 To prove that the legislature acted 
with discriminatory intent in promulgating a neutral-in-fact statute 
requires proof that it “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of 
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group.”70 The legislative history of the 
original veterans’ preference law, as well as the modern iterations, 
supported the conclusion that the law was intended to benefit all 
veterans, not merely males or male veterans.71 Since the plaintiff failed 
to demonstrate that the “law in any way reflect[ed] a purpose to 
discriminate on the basis of sex,” the Court found that the statute did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.72 However, the cases of 
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., provide parameters for evaluating whether state 
action is motivated by invidious gender discrimination. 
In Washington v. Davis, applicants for police officer positions at 
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department challenged 
 
 67. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (explaining the intermediate scrutiny framework that  
applies to statutes found to have a discriminatory effect on one sex). 
 68. Id. at 278. 
 69. Id. at 279 (citing United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 
179 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 279–80. 
 72. Id. at 281. 
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the department’s recruiting procedures, including a written personnel 
test that “excluded a disproportionately high number” of Black 
applicants.73 The test, referred to as “Test 21,” was designed by the Civil 
Service Commission to test “verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and 
comprehension.”74 Black applicants failed Test 21 more often than 
white applicants.75 The Court held that despite the disproportionate 
impact on Black applicants, no cognizable equal protection claim 
existed absent a racially discriminatory purpose.76 
One year later, in Arlington Heights, the respondent MHDC 
sought to build low-income and moderate-income housing, requesting a 
rezoning of a parcel of land from single family to multifamily.77 MHDC’s 
rezoning application included a reference to Section 236 of the federal 
Fair Housing Act, which required “an affirmative marketing plan 
designed to assure that a subsidized development is racially 
integrated.”78 The Village Plan Commission denied the respondent’s 
petition for rezoning on the grounds that (1) rezoning the parcel 
“threatened to cause a measurable drop in property value for 
neighboring sites” and (2) the Village’s zoning policy stated that 
multifamily zoning was “primarily to serve as a buffer between  
single-family development” and “commercial and manufacturing 
districts.”79 MHDC challenged the Village’s decision on the grounds 
that their denial of the rezoning request was racially discriminatory 
and thus violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.80 Both the US District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois and the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that 
the Village’s decision was motivated not by racial animus, but by a 
desire to protect property values and zoning plan integrity.81 However, 
the courts’ opinions differed on whether the denial would have a racially 
discriminatory effect—the district court concluded that the denial 
would not have a racially discriminatory effect, while the court of 
appeals found just the opposite.82 Under the appellate court’s decision, 
strict scrutiny must apply.  
 
 73. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232–33 (1976). 
 74. Id. at 234–35. 
 75. Id. at 235. 
 76. Id. at 245. 
 77. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254 (1977). 
 78. Id. at 257. 
 79. Id. at 258. 
 80. Id. at 254. 
 81. Id. at 259. 
 82. Id. at 259–60. 
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When the Supreme Court decided Arlington Heights, it 
reiterated that “official action will not be held unconstitutional solely 
because it results in a racially disproportionate impact” and that 
“[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show 
a violation” of the equal protection clause.83 The Court set forth a 
“sensitive inquiry” for determining whether the government actor’s 
decision was motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory purpose.84 
The proof of discriminatory purpose should be drawn from whatever 
“circumstantial and direct evidence of intent” is available, including, 
but not limited to, the disparate impact of the decision, the historical 
background of the decision, departures from normal procedures, and 
the legislative history of the action.85 If the decision can be explained on 
no grounds other than discrimination—even where it appears neutral 
on its face—the “evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.”86 The 
Court upheld the rezoning denial, finding that the respondent failed to 
meet its evidentiary burden of establishing that the aforementioned 
factors suggest that the denial was motivated by a discriminatory 
intent.87 
Considering the standard set forth in Washington v. Davis and 
affirmed in Arlington Heights, there is a substantial likelihood that any 
ban on ectogenesis for non-safety reasons88 (assuming the technology is 
safe for the prospective gestated fetus) would be motivated by invidious 
gender discrimination. First, the disparate impact of a ban on 
ectogenesis is notable, as previously discussed in Section IV.B, and is a 
factor favoring the conclusion of invidious gender discrimination. 
Second, the historical background of the dialogue surrounding 
ectogenesis in politics and art supports the same conclusion, although 
the specific legislative history of any statute (what would be the third 
factor) does not yet exist. One congressman has previously contended 
that the transition from viviparous gestation to ectogenesis would lead 
to the production of offspring that are “nothing but psychological 
monsters.”89 It is reasonable, therefore, to expect any legislative history 
 
 83. Id. at 264–65. 
 84. Id. at 265–66. 
 85. Id. at 266–68. 
 86. Id. at 266. 
 87. Id. at 270. 
 88. See id. at 264–65; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976). In this context,  
“non-safety reasons” means that the technology is assumed to be safe for the gestated fetus. 
 89. See 117 CONG. REC. 12736–44 (1971) (citing Man into Superman: The Promise and 
Peril of the New Genetics, TIME, Apr. 19, 1971, at 33, printed into the Congressional Record on 
request of Senator Walter Mondale in support of his proposal to create a Commission on Health, 
Science, and Society). 
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for ectogenesis bans to contain gendered references to the natural order 
and a host of implied or express gender discrimination. Similarly, 
congressional debates about anti-cloning bills have contained equally 
extreme denunciations. “There is no great invention,” as Haldane’s 
1923 address notes, “from fire to flying, which has not been hailed as an 
insult to some god.”90 This apothegm is manifest across the 
Congressional Record when reproductive biotechnology or comparably 
disruptive technologies are addressed. 
The history of congressional debate and activity provides insight 
into the moral disapproval that has informed prior legislative 
discussions on ectogenesis. David Weldon cosponsored a bill (H.R. 534) 
entitled the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, which sought to 
ban human cloning for both research and reproductive purposes.91 
Weldon asserted that the “artificial womb is available to us today” and 
that the combination of human cloning and artificial wombs rendered 
fetal tissue harvesting “the next place these researchers will want to 
go.”92 He argued that “it is a moral and ethical minefield that . . . we as 
a Nation should not enter into.”93 In 2007, an article by William B. 
Hurlbut was printed into the Congressional Record, stating that “the 
ongoing research to create an artificial endometrium (a kind of artificial 
womb) that would allow extracorporeal gestation of cloned embryos  
to later stages for the production of more advanced cells” posed 
“concerns about the commodification and commercialization of eggs  
and embryos.”94 These statements reflect congressional attitudes, 
especially, but not exclusively, that more technologically conservative 
factions would likely advance any ban on ectogenesis. This suggests 
that impermissible invidious gender discrimination would be present. 
In addition to the established legislative history, an ectogenesis 
ban could prove to be invidious discrimination when one considers the 
technology’s effect on traditional gender-based household dynamics. 
Ectogenesis will be a meaningful departure from the once-unavoidable 
gender roles implicated in traditional gestation. Given the intense 
moral dialogue around gender roles in the United States and the  
far-reaching impact that changes in the gestational status quo would 
have, the historical background of a ban on ectogenesis must be read 
broadly to be read accurately. Along with specific discussions of 
ectogenesis before the legislature, the discussions of gender morality in 
 
 90. HALDANE, supra note 6, at 44. 
 91. 149 CONG. REC. 4412 (2003) (statement of Rep. David Weldon). 
 92. Id. at 4414. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 153 CONG. REC. 8564 (2007). 
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US politics should come to bear on the historical background of any 
statute regarding ectogenesis. The Moral Majority, the organization 
whose socially conservative mission has continued to inform the US 
religious right, coalesced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, intent on 
“responding to a host of societal ills through legislation.”95 Their stated 
goals included reestablishing traditional gender roles and preventing 
the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, which “challenged the 
very foundation of the conservative Christian worldview: the idea that 
gender was a sacred, God-given certainty in an uncertain fluctuating 
world.”96 James Dobson, a psychologist whose books on gender and 
marriage captured the traditionalist models of sex and gender adopted 
by the Moral Majority, derided feminists for the erosion of respect for 
the masculine, viewing this “as a crisis of gender, but also as a threat 
to national security.”97 The gender-essentialist mission of the Moral 
Majority has persisted long after the formal dissolution of the 
organization in 1989.98  
Family values and the nature of gender roles are still important 
issues to US voters and their congresspeople. In 2015, 21 percent of 
Americans said they would only vote for a political candidate who 
shared their views on abortion, the highest in Gallup’s nineteen-year 
history of gathering data on this question.99 By 2020, that figure 
reached 24 percent, with 47 percent placing abortion as one of many 
important factors to their vote.100 Today, about 85 percent of Americans 
view cloning humans as morally wrong.101 While only 34 percent believe 
that children are just as well off if their mother works outside of the 
home, 76 percent believe the children are just as well off if their father 
works outside of the home.102 When surveyed, 53 percent believe that a 
 
 95. Doug Banwart, Jerry Falwell, the Rise of the Moral Majority, and the 1980 Election, 
W. ILL. HIST. REV. 133, 133–35 (2013). 
 96. Kristin Du Mez, Donald Trump and Militant Evangelical Masculinity, 
RELIGION & POL. (Jan. 17, 2017), http://religionandpolitics.org/2017/01/17/donald-trump-and-mil-
itant-evangelical-masculinity/ [https://perma.cc/2Y33-HXFC]; id. at 135. 
 97. Du Mez, supra note 96; see JAMES C. DOBSON, STRAIGHT TALK TO MEN AND THEIR 
WIVES (1980). 
 98. See Banwart, supra note 95, at 154. 
 99. Rebecca Riffkin, Abortion Edges Up as Important Voting Issue for Americans, GALLUP 
(May 29, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183449/abortion-edges-important-voting-issue-ameri-
cans.aspx? [https://perma.cc/LCZ4-8DK7]. 
 100. Megan Brenan, One in Four Americans Consider Abortion a Key Voting Issue, GALLUP 
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ing-issue.aspx [https://perma.cc/UMC3-F5HK]. 
 101. Moral Issues, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1681/Moral-Issues.aspx? 
[https://perma.cc/22YW-4L34] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
 102. D’Vera Cohn, Gretchen Livingston & Wendy Wang, Public Views on Staying at Home 
vs. Working, PEW RSCH. CTR.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Apr. 8, 2014), 
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woman would do a better job than a man in caring for a new baby, even 
excluding breastfeeding from consideration.103  
In a 2007 Gallup poll, 86 percent of Republicans and 72 percent 
of Democrats said that the presidential candidates’ “positions on family 
values” would be “extremely important” or “very important” to their 
voting choice. As of May 2016, 73 percent of Americans think “the state 
of moral values in the country as a whole” is getting worse.104 As moral 
and reproductive issues continue to dominate US political discourse, 
these perceptions and fears of technological disruption of reproduction 
are likely to influence legislative action. If and when a ban on 
ectogenesis is passed and challenged, evaluating the history of gender 
discrimination and related antecedent moral views must inform the 
inquiry into whether the historical background supports an implication 
of invidious gender discrimination. 
As to the fourth and last Arlington Heights factor, a ban on full 
ectogenesis would be a departure from normal procedure showing 
evidence of discriminatory intent. Importantly, Congress has previously 
offered regular support for the development and approval of artificial 
organs and research into the technological assistance of vital organ 
functions. In April 2011, 250 members of the House of Representatives 
and 60 senators sent a letter to the Food and Drug Administration 
expressing their support for the approval of the artificial pancreas.105 A 
bipartisan coalition of congressional leaders continued to speak out  
in favor of the development and approval of the artificial pancreas, 
calling it a “transformative medical technology” with the “potential to 
dramatically improve the health and quality of life of those who have 
diabetes.”106 Other artificial organs have received broad support from 
Congress. The 2010 Department of Defense and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act contained a $1 million funding allocation for work 
by the University of Tennessee College of Medicine with artificial  




 103. Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Kim Parker, Nikki Graf & Gretchen Livingston, Gender 
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 104. Moral Issues, supra note 101. 
 105. 157 CONG. REC. 14168 (2011) (statement of Rep. Gene Green). 
 106. Id. at 16215 (statement of Rep. John Kline), 18145 (statement of Rep. Patrick Tiberi). 
 107. 155 CONG. REC. 32623 (2009) (statement of Rep. Zach Wamp). 
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life-saving impact of the artificial kidney and the research into 
developing artificial livers.108  
In light of the aforementioned congressional endorsements of 
artificial organ development, it is apparent that Congress has no 
reservations about the replacement or salvaging of human organs with 
technological alternatives.109 The Court should consider this favorable 
disposition toward other artificial organs when analyzing any ban on 
ectogenesis. Congressional disapproval of this one technological organ, 
combined with the history of disapproval of artificial wombs in 
Congress and culture, would be strongly suggestive of invidious 
discrimination. If Congress espouses a general approval of artificial 
organs but carves out an exception for artificial wombs, combined with 
the congressional history of revulsion towards reproductive changes via 
technology, then invidious discrimination resolves the cognitive 
dissonance and balances the equation. The objections are not about 
artificial organs—they are about shifting gender norms. 
In Washington v. Davis, the Court held that where a legislative 
action could be explained by nothing other than invidious 
discrimination, it would fail even when the statute was neutral on its 
face. As discussed throughout this Article so far, the economic and social 
costs of physical gestation are great. The availability of a technological 
alternative stands to alleviate these enormous costs and provides an 
alternative to gestation that is safer for both the mother and fetus. 
Should fetus-safe full ectogenesis become available, it would be difficult 
to explain its prohibition on any grounds other than a desire to preserve 
traditional gender roles.  
In sum, given the disparate impact on women, the likely 
legislative discourse, and subsequent deviation from the historical 
legislative support of artificial organs, a ban on ectogenesis would likely 
be found to have been motivated, at least in part, by intentional 
invidious gender discrimination. Thus, at a minimum, both the 
discriminatory impact and discriminatory purpose required by Feeney 
would be met by any ban on ectogenesis, urging the application of 
intermediate scrutiny to a ban on ectogenesis. 
3. Whether an Ectogenesis Ban Would Survive Intermediate Scrutiny 
If a ban on ectogenesis either contained a facial classification on 
the basis of gender or was facially neutral but the Feeney evil purpose 
 
 108. See 148 CONG. REC. E199 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott); 
152 CONG. REC. 8857 (2006) (statement of Rep. Stephen Lynch). 
 109. This author performed a thorough search of the Congressional Record and found no 
negative treatment of any artificial non-uterus organ by any member of Congress from any party. 
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test was satisfied, the Court would apply intermediate scrutiny to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the statute. Intermediate scrutiny 
requires that the government establish that there is an important 
government interest and that the classification is substantially related 
to that interest, serving as a middle ground between strict scrutiny and 
rational basis review.110 Given the enormous potential benefits of 
ectogenetic technologies, it would be difficult for the government to 
articulate important interests that could be advanced by a ban on 
ectogenesis. 
The Court has yet to hear an equal protection case regarding 
ectogenesis or a direct analogue to ectogenesis, which renders the task 
of analyzing the constitutionality of such a potential statute premature. 
Furthermore, whether an interest is sufficiently “important” for 
intermediate scrutiny purposes is an exercise in subjectivity that varies 
depending on the level of generality the Court uses to articulate the 
interest.111 However, the equal protection jurisprudential landscape 
does provide some sense of the types of government interests that are 
or are not characterized as “important” and, more operatively, whether 
gendered classifications are held to be substantially related to those 
interests. While important interests in support of a ban on ectogenesis 
might include ensuring the health of prospective mothers and gestated 
infants or regulating the practice of medicine, the government would 
also bear the burden of establishing that a ban on ectogenesis is 
substantially related to those interests. While intermediate scrutiny 
appears to be a two-part test, the prongs are typically analyzed together 
such that the inquiry is in fact whether the stated government interest 
is substantially advanced by the classification. 
Predicting accurately how the Court might interpret the 
importance of the interests set forth in support of a ban on ectogenesis 
is difficult. The case law provides limited instruction. Interests that 
have been held insufficiently important include “reducing the workload 
on probate courts” and “avoiding intrafamily controversy.”112 Achieving 
administrative efficiency is likewise an inadequate state objective.113 
Benign race or gender classifications, classifications drawn in an 
attempt to remedy specific historical examples of prejudice, are 
unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny where the classification 
is not tied to a sufficiently precise historical disadvantage.114 In United 
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States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court reviewed the Virginia Military 
Institute’s male-only admissions policy under intermediate scrutiny.115 
While the Court held that the mission of educating “citizen soldiers” 
was important, the discriminatory admissions policy was not 
“substantially advanced by women’s categorical exclusion.”116  
In the case of ectogenesis, if the articulated government interest 
was the protection of the health of prospective mothers, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to argue that a ban on the technology 
substantially serves that interest. As discussed throughout this Article, 
gestation is a dangerous endeavor. Since the Center for Disease Control 
began its Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System in 1987, maternal 
mortality in the United States has steadily risen.117 For women in their 
childbearing years, death as a result of complications from pregnancy 
is a top-ten cause of death for women in their childbearing years.118 
While protecting maternal life and health would very likely constitute 
an important government interest, a ban on ectogenesis would actively 
undermine that purpose, not substantially advance it. Protecting the 
lives of infants gestated by ectogenesis is also likely to be understood as 
an important government interest. Whether a ban substantially relates 
to that goal would simply depend on the nature of the technology. If the 
technology substantially improves outcomes for gestated infants, such 
as reducing the incidence of birth defects, or has a neutral impact on 
neonatal outcomes, the government would be unlikely to succeed in 
satisfying its burden to prove that a ban is substantially related to the 
interest of protecting gestating infants. If the technology is unable to 
safely bring a child to term, then even rational basis review would be 
inadequate to prevent a ban, as discussed later in this Article. 
If the Court applies intermediate scrutiny to a ban on 
ectogenesis, the likelihood of success would vary based on the actual 
impacts of the applied technology, the level of generality with which the 
Court articulates the government interest(s), and whether those 
interests are deemed sufficiently important. 
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V. STRICT SCRUTINY OF CLASSIFICATIONS IMPLICATING A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
When an equal protection challenge is brought on the grounds 
that a classification implicates a fundamental right, the Court performs 
a two-part analysis. First, the Court asks whether the classification 
implicates a fundamental right.119 Second, the Court asks whether that 
right was infringed.120 If both of these parts are satisfied, the Court 
applies strict scrutiny to the constitutionality assessment.121 In the case 
of a ban on ectogenesis, the Court should find that the two-part test is 
satisfied and require, pursuant to strict scrutiny, that the government 
bear the burden of proving that its classification is narrowly tailored to 
fulfill a compelling government interest.122 
A. The Classification Implicates the Fundamental Right to Procreate 
The Court has held that the right to procreate is fundamental, 
as it is both essential “to the very existence and survival of the race” 
and “one of the basic civil rights of man.”123 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
the petitioner was convicted once for stealing chickens and twice for 
robbery with firearms and was imprisoned in the Oklahoma State 
Reformatory when Oklahoma’s 1935 Habitual Criminal Sterilization 
Act was passed.124 The Act provided that those convicted of three or 
more “felonies involving moral turpitude” be subject to sterilization, 
and so a judgment directing that he be sterilized by vasectomy was 
made.125 In reviewing his case, the Supreme Court defined procreation 
as a fundamental right whose infringement should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny.126 Sterilizing some types of criminals, and not 
others “who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense,” 
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was held to run afoul of the equal protection clause.127 The 
characterization of procreation as a fundamental right in Skinner has 
been upheld, without exception, in subsequent case law since the 
seminal holding in 1942. Because the manner of gestation is central to 
the process of procreating, ectogenesis implicates this fundamental 
right to procreate. Parents who wish to procreate must have a viable 
womb or contract to utilize a viable womb in order to procreate.  
In Griswold v. Connecticut, which involved a challenge to a 
Connecticut ban on contraceptive distribution, the Court held that a 
“zone of privacy” is “created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees” and that the marital relationship, including the marital 
bedroom and choices made therein, is protected by this right of 
privacy.128 The Court held that the ban on contraceptive use was an 
unconstitutional intrusion into the realm of martial privacy, “a right of 
privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”129 A decision about how to gestate 
one’s child lands squarely within this zone of privacy because it is a 
choice undertaken with the highest sensitivity, having the nearest 
connection to marital and medical privacy of almost any other decision 
a person might make. Since it was decided, Griswold has been 
consistently cited and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court as meaning 
that “the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of 
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.” Further, 
Griswold and its jurisprudential progeny clarify that the “decision 
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster 
of constitutionally protected choices.”130 Therefore, a ban on 
ectogenesis—one of the few available gestational methods—would 
clearly implicate the fundamental right to procreate.131 Like 
contraception, ectogenesis is technology that would have been 
unimaginable to the framers of the Constitution. Yet, the use of both 
technologies falls within the zone of privacy older than the Bill of Rights 
and is essential to the expression of personhood and family: whether, 
when, and how to bear a child. 
B. The Fundamental Right to Procreate Would Be Infringed 
Once the Court has found that a classification implicates a 
fundamental right, it endeavors to determine whether that right is 
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infringed by the classification. Infringement may take the form of either 
an outright prohibition on the exercise of a fundamental right or some 
lesser means of limiting the exercise of that right. In Kramer v. Union 
Free School District, a bachelor who neither owned nor leased taxable 
property within a school district challenged a New York education law 
on the grounds that it violated the equal protection clause.132 The law 
specified that only those who owned or leased “taxable real property 
within the district” or who were parents or custodial guardians of 
“children enrolled in the local public schools” were entitled to vote in 
the school district elections.133 The Court gave “the statute a close and 
exacting determination” because the right to vote is a fundamental one. 
It therefore found that the extension of the franchise to some residents 
and not others denied equal protection of the laws to Kramer and others 
who were excluded by the statute.134 An outright ban on ectogenesis 
would justify a comparably exacting determination about whether the 
right to procreate was infringed. The fundamental right to control and 
manage one’s own reproductive choices deserves the same scope of 
protection as the right to vote, as it is at least as essential to the exercise 
of liberty in a free society as participation in the political process. 
Infringement may also be found from a “lesser interference” that 
“substantially deters the exercise of the right or makes the exercise of 
the right materially more difficult.”135 In Attorney General of New York 
v. Soto-Lopez, veterans who enlisted while domiciled in Puerto Rico 
brought an equal protection challenge to a civil service employment 
preference.136 The preference granted additional points on the civil 
service examination scores to honorably discharged veterans who were 
domiciled in New York at the time they joined the military.137 The 
petitioners argued that this preference infringed upon the right to 
travel, a fundamental constitutional right, which is “firmly established 
and has been repeatedly recognized by our cases.”138 Noting that  
the “right-to-migrate cases have principally involved the . . . indirect 
manner of burdening the right,” the Court found the right infringed 
upon by the deprivation of the veterans’ credits based on residence at 
time of entry.139 By denying these benefits to otherwise qualified 
 
 132. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969). 
 133. Id.  
 134. See id. at 626–33. 
 135. Galloway, supra note 35, at 149. 
 136. Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 899–901 (1986). 
 137. Id. at 900. 
 138. Id. at 902–03. 
 139. Id. at 903, 910–11. 
2021] EQUAL PROTECTION AND ECTOGENESIS 805 
veterans, New York sufficiently deterred the exercise of the right to 
migrate in violation of the equal protection clause. 
In the case of a ban on ectogenesis, the fundamental right would 
indeed be infringed. Rather than an outright prohibition on the exercise 
of the right to procreate, as in Kramer, a ban on the use of ectogenesis 
would be an indirect infringement on women’s right to procreate by both 
deterring its exercise and by making “the exercise of the right 
materially more difficult.”140 Indeed, the burdens on the right to 
procreate would be notably similar to the infringement on the right to 
travel in Soto-Lopez. Like the right to travel, the right to procreate is a 
fundamental right firmly established and repeatedly reaffirmed by the 
Court. Under Soto-Lopez, when a classification materially deters the 
exercise of a fundamental right, that right is infringed and the 
classification cannot withstand scrutiny.141  
Gestation imposes physical and psychological burdens and 
injuries on even healthy women. There are few procreative options  
for women who cannot or will not undergo the difficulties of  
traditional reproduction, and a ban on reproductive ectogenesis would 
unquestionably make procreation materially more difficult. Gestation 
requires a womb—an organ that a broad class of individuals does not 
have access to—including but not limited to heterosexual and 
homosexual men, women with uterine malformations, women who 
cannot gestate, women whose careers make gestation impossible or 
unsafe, single parents, low-income couples with infertility, and women 
who are HIV positive or who have other high-risk pregnancy markers. 
In order to procreate, members of this “wombless class” must gain 
access to a womb, which is often accomplished through a coparenting 
relationship (marriage or parenting as a couple). But sometimes, these 
wombless individuals can gain access via costly gestational surrogacy. 
A ban on ectogenesis would substantially deter the members of the 
aforementioned class from procreation, as cost-effective womb access is 
a high barrier to their reproductive endeavor.  
Currently, traditional and gestational surrogacy are some of the 
only options for those who cannot traditionally bear children.142 
Although traditional surrogacy is less expensive than gestational 
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surrogacy, it produces a child genetically unrelated to the intended 
mother, and still costs between $90,000 and $130,000 in the United 
States.143 These factors render it inaccessible to the vast majority of 
Americans. On the other hand, reproductive medical tourism to 
countries like the Ukraine brings the cost of gestational surrogacy to an 
average of $30,000, which is both still financially out of reach for most 
prospective parents and inextricable from ethical concerns.144 Due to 
widespread exploitation of surrogates, commercial surrogacy has been 
banned in India, Nepal, and Thailand.145 These figures do not include 
the cost of in vitro fertilization, which can cost anywhere between 
$12,000 and $17,000 per cycle—and multiple cycles are frequently 
required—nor do they include the potential costs of the surrogate’s loss 
of work or other injuries, which are typically covered by the intended 
parents.146 Surrogacy is a costly alternative, out of reach for most, and 
sometimes ethically fraught. 
Ectogenesis will enable women to exercise their right to 
procreate without bearing the exceptional physical discomfort and 
injury, risk of death, professional harm, and emotional stress inherent 
to in vivo gestation. The existence of a technology that could drive down 
the costs of gestating a fetus ex vivo would make procreation possible 
for many, and it could obviate the choice between bodily integrity and 
parenthood faced by all women. There can be little disagreement  
that any child-bearing endeavor, whether by traditional gestation  
or gestational surrogacy, involving the aforementioned harms of 
pregnancy would be materially more difficult than the same endeavor 
involving no such burdens. Therefore, the Court should find that a ban 
on ectogenesis infringes on the fundamental right to procreate and 
require, pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard, the government to 
show that a ban is narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling government 
interest. 
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VI. RATIONAL BASIS: NO SUSPECT CLASS AND NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
Furthermore, even if the Court failed to recognize the 
immutability and burden of a significant right demanding more bite to 
its rational basis review, any ban on safe ectogenesis should still likely 
fail for lack of a legitimate interest. If the Court were to conclude that 
a ban on ectogenesis neither contains impermissible gender-based 
discrimination nor infringes upon the fundamental right to procreate, 
then the statute would be analyzed under a much less demanding 
judicial standard: rational basis review. The rational basis test is the 
“traditional standard of review,” applying to all government action not 
subject to heightened scrutiny. The test “requires only that the [state 
action] be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state 
purposes.”147 The standard is highly deferential to the government, 
presuming its classification to be constitutional, and the challenger 
must prove that there is no conceivable rational basis that could 
support the action.148 However, there are still government actions 
struck down under rational basis review as being based on illegitimate 
state interests, and any state interest in banning safe ectogenesis is 
likely illegitimate. 
A. Legitimate State Interests 
Under rational basis review, the challenger bears the burden of 
proving that there is no rational relation between the government 
action and a legitimate state interest.149 In rational basis jurisprudence, 
courts have broadly construed the legitimacy of state interests to ensure 
wide latitude for a government’s enactment. In addition, courts have 
often considered any conceivable government interest as sufficient 
grounds for enactment.150 The legislature is permitted to fashion 
remedies that are over- or underinclusive, and “reform may take one 
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems 
most acute to the legislative mind.”151 In the absence of an actual 
statute and corresponding legislative history to analyze, this Article is 
limited to a discussion of what state interests might be set forth in 
support of a ban on ectogenetic technologies, although they are not 
difficult to predict. In the ectogenesis context, stated legitimate 
interests might include the preservation of maternal health, the safety 
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of unborn fetuses, the welfare of children potentially born via 
ectogenesis, or the regulation of the practice of medicine. If any of the 
aforementioned legitimate interests are the only ones evidenced by the 
legislative history, any legal challenge to an ectogenesis ban, if 
analyzed under the rational basis review, would likely fail. Throughout 
this Part, the Article discusses those interests that are illegitimate and 
cannot support government regulations, even under rational basis 
review. 
There is a middle-ground state, whereby a legitimate 
government interest is “tainted” by an illegitimate purpose.152 In this 
hybrid situation, “the reasoning or motivation leading a state to pursue 
an ostensibly legitimate state interest includes an illegitimate 
assumption or belief, such as an irrational fear or impermissible 
stereotype.”153 To give a hypothetical example, if the legitimate interest 
of protecting the welfare of infants is based on the illegitimate 
stereotype that a mother who would choose to gestate via ectogenesis is 
uncaring and thus unfit, the legitimate interest is tainted as 
inextricably linked to the illegitimate one. Given the congressional 
tendency toward Puritanism regarding reproductive biotechnology, this 
type of hybrid legitimacy situation is likely to occur. 
Plainly illegitimate interests, including any interest rooted in 
animus or manifesting moral disapproval, cannot validly support a ban 
on ectogenesis, even under the most deferential rational basis level of 
scrutiny. 
B. Animus Is Not a Legitimate State Interest 
In Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down an amendment to 
Colorado’s constitution prohibiting any “legislative, executive or 
judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to 
protect . . . gays and lesbians.”154 The Amendment (Amendment 2) 
required the immediate repeal of any state or local policy that “barred 
discrimination based on sexual orientation” and prevented any such 
measures from being adopted in the future.155 The Court opinion stated 
that Amendment 2 “impose[d] a special disability upon” gay and  
lesbian people and denied them “protections against exclusion from  
an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that 
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constitute[d] ordinary civic life in a free society.”156 Finding that the 
Amendment was an excessively broad “status-based enactment,” the 
Court held that it was too “far removed” from the articulated state 
interests to be rationally related to them.157 Referring to the holding in 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno that animus can 
never be a legitimate state interest, it struck down Amendment 2 as 
violative of the equal protection clause.158 
Under Romer, any ban on the use of ectogenesis rooted in disgust 
or animus is illegitimate. As discussed throughout this Article, 
ectogenesis invokes visceral responses from individuals all over the 
political, spiritual, and identity spectrums. The reaction to a certain 
technology as “unfair, unseemly, or just plain wrong” has been called 
the “yuck factor.”159 Bioethicists have raised these arguments “in an 
effort to defeat the use or expansion of biotechnological advances such 
as human cloning, nanotechnology (including nanobiotechnology and 
nanomedicine), assisted human reproduction” and many others.160 Leon 
Kass, former chairman of the President’s Council on Bioethics 
characterized the yuck factor as “the emotional expression of deep 
wisdom, beyond reason’s power completely to articulate.”161 He 
suggested that this “wisdom of repugnance” should guide discussions 
and decisions regarding bioethics.162 
While Kass proposes origins of wisdom for these admittedly 
“emotional expression[s],” reason is a process of conscious deductive 
reasoning from verifiable facts, not an amorphous and immeasurable 
gut feeling. Instead, the yuck factor is a form of knee-jerk animus. It is 
the revulsion one feels toward someone or something before they are 
able to bring forth any rational basis. Martha Nussbaum has criticized 
reliance on the yuck factor, noting that, historically, yuck factor 
arguments have been used to justify racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, 
homophobia, and other forms of discrimination.163 She posits that the 
“moral progress of society can be measured by the degree to which it 
separates disgust from danger and indignation, basing laws and social 
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rules on substantive harm, rather than on the symbolic relationship an 
object bears to our anxieties.”164 
In the case of ectogenesis, constitutionally illegitimate animus 
might manifest as disgust for the suite of technologies involved in full 
ectogenesis. This would be a misinterpretation because the technologies 
utilized in full ectogenesis are the same technologies already used in 
partial ectogenesis to finish the development of premature infants. 
Breathing apparati, feeding tubes, waste removal, incubation, and 
other pieces of the ectogenesis suite are currently operating in NICUs 
worldwide, much to the appreciation and praise of Congress and society 
at large. To achieve full ectogenesis, modifications of preexisting 
technologies will be made, but the essential functions of these 
technologies will not be novel. If disgust is absent toward the 
technologies already applied in other contexts, then disgust toward the 
same technologies applied to full ectogenesis must not be about the 
technology itself, but the intended end: the voluntary gestation of 
babies outside of a woman’s body. In other words, liberating women 
from the risks and discomforts of gestation may be what provokes the 
yuck response. 
Animus toward the process of full ectogenesis would be animus 
toward the female rejection of or incapacity for the childbearing role. 
Men face no such animus for failing to gestate their children inside their 
bodies. Instead, this animus would be particularized toward women and 
based on social expectations for the roles occupied by women’s bodies. 
In the context of gestation, there is no meaningful distinction between 
biological roles and social roles. Romer and its progeny have instructed 
that animus is not a legitimate government interest. Therefore, any ban 
on ectogenesis based on a government purpose rooted in bare disgust or 
a yuck response should not satisfy the requirement of legitimacy, even 
under the deferential rational basis standard. 
C. Moral Condemnation Is Not a Legitimate State Interest 
In the 2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck 
down a Texas anti-sodomy statute on due process and equal protection 
grounds, reaffirming the right to privacy within interpersonal and 
family decisions, as well as the right to equal treatment under the 
law.165 Importantly, Lawrence held that moral disapproval does not 
constitute a legitimate state interest.166 This holding suggests that, in 
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the future, the Court would be unlikely to uphold a ban on ectogenesis 
that is justified by any blatant moral propositions. Impermissible 
manifestations of moral condemnation include assertions that it is 
wrong to deviate from biological imperatives, beliefs that the traditional 
social role of women should be preserved, and the belief that ectogenesis 
offends a spiritual entity or nature. Indeed, any permutation of a 
government interest that seeks to preserve the biological role of women 
as gestators can be reduced to the illegitimate morality-based purpose 
of condemning deviation from a biological and social role. 
With regards to gestation, biological and social roles have been, 
thus far, inseparable. In Nguyen v. INS, the Court held that the 
“difference between men and woman in relation to the birth process is 
a real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress 
to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.”167 
One might interpret this to suggest that any gender-based distinctions 
regarding the birth process are legitimate. However, the Court 
considers the classifications made in the context of the specific problem 
the legislature seeks to address. In Nguyen, the government sought to 
assure a parent-child relationship between the citizen parent and the 
child seeking citizenship. In childbirth, the gestating mother is 
apparent so the ease of proving maternity exceeds the ease of proving 
paternity. There is a meaningful distinction to be made between the 
sexes for the purposes of proving a parent-child relationship, which is 
rationally related to the heightened standards for establishing 
paternity created by the challenged statute. No such meaningful 
distinction would exist between men and women with regards to a ban 
on ectogenesis. Instead, a ban on ectogenesis justified by the distinct 
biological role of women would be an impermissible attempt to legislate 
social roles or to preserve a gestating class of persons. 
A gender-based stereotype is “a generalised view or 
preconception about attributes or characteristics that are or ought to be 
possessed by, or the roles that are or should be performed by women 
and men.”168 The social roles we occupy, and the stereotypes used to 
enforce them, are partial products of our biological capacities and 
limitations. The biological “birth lottery” determines the reproductive 
organs we are and are not born with, and social gender roles influence 
how others react toward us vis-à-vis biological chance. The Court should 
find resounding injustice in allowing the enforcement through law of 
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immutable biological roles, as these roles are meaningful only to the 
extent that society maps behavioral expectations onto biological 
attributes. Forcing female-bodied humans, rather than machines, to 
perform the social function of gestation creates a caste based on 
immutable characteristics, which is repugnant to the principles of equal 
protection. 
Per the Lawrence holding that moral disapproval cannot be a 
legitimate state interest, any government interest that is based on the 
moral position that biological destiny requires female-bodied people to 
gestate cannot prevail under rational basis review. In Lawrence, the 
Court found that the impermissible moral objection had been “shaped 
by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and 
respect for the traditional family.”169 The gendered biosocial roles 
implicated by ectogenesis are shaped by these same factors. 
Moral objections to ectogenesis are widespread. Religious bodies 
and authors have singled out ectogenesis as a unique threat to the 
traditional family. Susan E. Wills wrote that despite the “burden on a 
mother’s physical health,” pregnancy is “a graced time . . . for learning 
the selfless art of mothering.”170 The inference is that ectogenesis would 
remove the mother and child from “grace” and prevent the mother from 
developing the virtue of selflessness required to be a good mother. 
Further, in 1987, the Vatican released Instruction on Respect for 
Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, explaining 
the Roman Catholic Church’s moral objections to the use of 
heterologous and homologous in vitro fertilization, gestational and 
traditional surrogacy, and heterologous- and homologous-assisted 
insemination.171 In this position paper, the Church stated that 
“[s]urrogate motherhood represents an objective failure to meet the 
obligations of maternal love, of conjugal fidelity and of responsible 
motherhood; it offends the dignity and the right of the child to be 
conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up 
by his own parents.”172 Asserting that surrogacy “sets up, to the 
detriment of families, a division between the physical, psychological 
and moral elements which constitute those families,” the Church takes 
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a clear stance in opposition to the use of traditional or gestational 
surrogacy.173 While the Roman Catholic Church has not yet given a 
formal statement on the permissibility of ectogenesis, it has held that 
“the hypothesis or project of constructing artificial uteruses for the 
human embryo” is “contrary to the human dignity proper to the 
embryo.”174 These religious arguments speaking to the division of labor 
within and nature of a traditional family are precisely the type of moral 
objections that Lawrence has held cannot support legislative action, 
even under rational basis review.  
Moral objections based on other, less-gendered conceptions of 
“right and acceptable behavior” are likewise wrongful bases for support 
of legislative acts. In a 1996 interview with the New York Times, 
bioethicist Arthur L. Caplan stated that the intervention in human 
reproductive processes poses many moral and ethical questions such 
that “[t]he future is rosy for bioethicists.”175 Feminist bioethicist 
Rosemarie Tong has expressed concern that ectogenesis “could lead to 
a commodification of the whole process of pregnancy.”176 And Stephen 
Wilkinson has addressed arguments against commodification in the 
context of selective reproduction, noting that “to call something 
‘commodification’ is to express moral disapproval and to refer to a 
distinctive kind of wrong: the wrong of commodification.”177 To 
commodify something, Wilkinson argues, is to treat it as if it (1) has a 
price, (2) is fungible, and (3) has only instrumental value.178 While no 
cogent outlines of how ectogenesis will cause this purported 
commodification of babies or pregnancy have been set forth, such 
arguments are rooted in moral disapproval and, thus, cannot serve as 
legitimate state interests. 
In Lawrence, the Court made clear that arguments based on 
moral disapproval, such as religious beliefs, views of the traditional 
family, or conceptions of proper and acceptable behavior, are not 
legitimate state interests. Our cultural, political, and bioethical 
landscapes are littered with moral critiques of ectogenesis, and these 
critiques are guaranteed to inform Congress’s treatment of ectogenesis 
in the future. Therefore, any state interest backing a ban on safe 
ectogenesis is likely to be illegitimate and unable to withstand even 
rational basis review. 
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VII. RATIONAL BASIS WITH BITE 
Even if the Court were to conclude that a ban on ectogenesis 
neither contains impermissible gender-based discrimination, nor 
infringement upon the fundamental right to procreate, the Court should 
find ectogenesis bans violative of equal protection. When the Court 
finds that neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny applies, it analyzes 
statutes under the much less demanding judicial standard—rational 
basis review. The rational basis test is the “traditional standard of 
review,” applying to all government action not subject to heightened 
scrutiny, which “requires only the [state action] be shown to bear some 
rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”179  
However, while cases analyzed under the deferential rational 
basis test generally resolve in favor of the government actor, there were 
eighteen cases between 1971 and 2014 that were analyzed under 
rational basis and resolved in favor of the challenger.180 These cases, 
where the Court seemed to apply a somewhat higher standard, have 
been referred to as “rational basis with bite” cases.181 In an analysis of 
these cases, Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel identified nine factors that 
generally recur, casting some light on the conditions that cause the 
Court to apply this modified rational basis standard.182 The factors 
include “history of discrimination, political powerlessness, capacity to 
contribute to society, immutability, burdening a significant right, 
animus, federalism concerns, discrimination of an unusual character, 
and inhibiting personal relationships.”183 Of the aforementioned 
factors, the two most likely to appear where the Court applies rational 
basis with bite are immutability and the burdening of a substantial 
right.184 This Part briefly discusses the Court’s use of rational basis with 
bite and evaluates the likely outcome of a challenge to a ban on 
ectogenesis should the Court apply this heightened standard. The 
ability to gestate is immutable, pertains to the exercise of the 
fundamental right to procreate, and carries a history of discrimination. 
Thus, if the Court applies rational basis to a ban on ectogenesis, that 
rational basis should “bite” and some of the burden should be shifted to 
the government to provide the rationality of its actions. 
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In the rational basis with bite cases, the Court purports to apply 
the rational basis test, yet deviates from some of the core features that 
define that deferential standard. Whereas the challenger bears the 
entire burden of proving that there is no conceivable state interest 
rationally related to the government’s enactment under the traditional 
rational basis test, the Court might “shift the burden to the State to 
prove the enactment’s rationality,” “deem the purpose of the legislation 
to be an illegitimate state interest,” “weigh the benefits and harms of 
the challenged statute,” “demand persuasive evidence” from the 
government, or “reject a statute that furthers a state interest by 
burdening one group while ignoring the other groups” when rational 
basis bites.185 While under the traditional rational basis test the 
challenger bears the entire burden of proving that there is no 
conceivable state interest rationally related to the government’s 
enactment, the Court takes liberties with this level of deference 
whenever rational basis bites. A ban on ectogenesis would implicate a 
majority of the recurring factors in rational basis with bite cases, 
including a history of discrimination, immutability, burdening a 
significant right, animus, federalism concerns, discrimination of an 
unusual character, and inhibiting personal relationships. The Sections 
that follow consider immutability and the burdening of a significant 
right because these factors seem most suggestive of the Court’s 
willingness to apply the heightened standard.186 
A. Immutability 
A trait is immutable when it is not amenable to change. 
Immutable traits include race, national origin, alienage, illegitimacy, 
and gender.187 Judge William A. Norris discussed the nature of 
immutable traits stating that “at a minimum . . . the Supreme Court is 
willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if changing it would 
involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a 
traumatic change of identity.”188 The difficulty of the change is not the 
dispositive feature of immutability; instead, it implicates “those traits 
that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for 
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government to penalize a person for refusing to change them.”189 
Continuing, Judge Norris held that, for example, racial discrimination 
“would not suddenly become constitutional if medical science developed 
an easy, cheap, and painless method of changing one’s skin pigment.”190 
In Plyler v. Doe, the Court held that “legislation imposing special 
disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond 
their control suggests the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”191 Thus, the US legal 
system rejects the imposition of burdens on individuals due to the 
fortunes or misfortunes of their draw in the birth lottery. In Fronteiro 
v. Richardson, for example, the Court identified “that the key factor is 
that the trait is beyond the individual’s control” because in order to 
adhere to basic principles of equal protection, “legal burdens should 
bear some relationship to individual responsibility.”192  
The inability to pursue the fundamental right to procreate 
without the painful and sometimes dangerous physical burdens of 
pregnancy is necessarily an immutable characteristic. A person is 
either born with or without the physical capacity to gestate. For those 
born with female reproductive organs, the survival of our species and 
the transmission of the individual’s genetic material to the next 
generation requires a substantial invasion of bodily autonomy. Absent 
ectogenesis, every person who becomes a parent does so through the use 
of a woman’s uterus: either their own, their partner’s, or a surrogate’s. 
This biological fact renders women indispensable parts of the 
reproductive process, but it also burdens their bodies in ways dangerous 
and difficult, as discussed throughout this Article. These burdens are 
immutable in that they are unavoidable without technological 
intervention. The Court has consistently recognized procreation as a 
fundamental right and should thus recognize the importance of access 
to reproductive biotechnology in furtherance of the expression of that 
right.  
The immutability of reproductive organs in the context of the 
essential function of reproduction, both for individual and broader 
survival needs of humankind, renders ectogenesis important for 
relieving women of their technologically avoidable roles within the 
hierarchy of reproductive burdens. Precluding women from utilizing 
technologies that could enable procreation without bodily intrusion 
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prevents women from leaving the gestating class, unless they are also 
willing to sacrifice the pursuit of parenthood—a right that has been 
repeatedly affirmed as fundamental. But women do not gestate for 
themselves alone. They bear the societal burden of gestation to the 
benefit of other women (in the case of surrogacy), men (in nearly all 
cases), the children gestated and delivered, the government, and the 
human species as a whole. But the role of gestator is assigned at birth 
and carries physical, economic, and social costs. Judge Norris spoke of 
immutable characteristics as traits “that are so central to a person’s 
identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person 
for refusing to change them.”193 The corollary of this is that an 
immutable characteristic is so central to a person’s identity that it 
would be abhorrent, and contrary to principles of equal protection, to 
penalize a person for changing them. Ectogenesis provides an 
opportunity for women to change the impact of an immutable 
characteristic on their roles in society and within the family, without 
having to sacrifice the deep personal meanings of parenthood or the 
privacy of the marital relationship by involving another woman to serve 
as surrogate. For a legislature to deny them that opportunity is to 
legislate a permanent class or caste of gestating people, which is 
repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B. Burdening of a Significant Right 
As when legislative action implicates an immutable 
characteristic, the Court is more likely to apply rational basis with bite 
when the government act burdens a significant right. Although they are 
not fundamental, significant rights may be those that are “substantial 
enough to warrant careful review of the law’s rationality,” perhaps 
because the rights are very important or “quasi-fundamental.”194  
In Plyler v. Doe, the Court held that, although education is not a 
fundamental right, the interest is important enough to warrant a more 
searching review of the statute’s rationality.195 Holocyz-Pimentel’s 
article identifies several rational basis with bite cases where the  
Court did not specifically address the rights at stake, but where each 
involved “important personal interests pertaining to the home and 
association.”196 For example, in Lindsey v. Normet, the Court found that 
a double-bond and other burdensome requirements for an appeal of 
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eviction cases violated the equal protection clause because it bore “no 
reasonable relationship to any valid state objective.”197 The Court 
stated that while it did not “denigrate the importance of decent, safe, 
and sanitary housing . . . the Constitution does not provide judicial 
remedies for every social and economic ill.”198 There, the interest was 
important, but not fundamental such that it warranted strict scrutiny. 
In cases involving substantial, but not fundamental, rights, the Court 
can “avoid establishing or enlarging a fundamental right with 
potentially far-reaching consequences” by applying a heightened 
rational basis review to a specific case.199  
Ectogenesis implicates the fundamental right to procreate, but 
it also implicates the important or substantial right to utilize 
technology to improve health outcomes. The Court has not yet rendered 
a decision about whether certain reproductive technologies, such as in 
vitro fertilization, are protected as fundamental or quasi-fundamental 
rights. However, fundamental or not, it is improbable that the Court 
would fail to identify the important interest of prospective mothers in 
using ectogenetic technology to avoid the substantial physical risks 
inherent to traditional gestation. The Court might also find the 
economic and social hardships borne by gestating women substantial 
enough to warrant a more searching review of the rationality of a ban 
on ectogenesis. Ectogenesis implicates immutable characteristics and 
substantial or important rights. Therefore, if the Court chose to apply 
the rational basis test, that test should bite. This might look like 
shifting the burden to the government, requiring greater justification 
for the legitimate government interest, or seeking more convincing 
evidence that the ban is rationally related to the state interest 
articulated. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As tools from far-future science fiction converge with our reality, 
we are challenged to engage with each innovation so as to maximize 
human welfare. Partial ectogenesis is here and the advent of full 
ectogenesis is imminent. The Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection clause provides ample avenues for protecting access to 
ectogenetic technology. Whether the Court applies intermediate 
scrutiny, strict scrutiny, rational basis, or rational basis with bite, there 
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are strong arguments to be made in support of a challenger’s equal 
protection rights to use ectogenesis for reproductive purposes. 
The best of conservatism strikes a balance between preserving 
what is precious while simultaneously holding the truth that humanity 
must constantly adapt or die out. In every neonatal intensive care unit, 
a suite of once-unimaginable ectogenetic technologies supports the most 
delicate members of humankind. As these technologies continue to 
develop, we will become empowered to save countless infants born too 
young, too frail, or too small to survive without assistance. Mothers will 
be saved from nerve damage, incontinence, hemorrhaging, and death. 
Prospective parents, once unable to procreate, will access supportive 
technologies that help them create a family. That twenty-four-week-old 
infant saved by ectogenesis could be the next Maya Angelou, Jennifer 
Doudna, or Luigi Boccherini. 
That is the essence of what ectogenesis is about: the flourishing 
of human life. And that is the essence of what the Constitution and 
equal protection clause are about: the flourishing of human life. They 
are simply tools to reach that goal. 
